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Introduction 
The growing number of products is one of the main features of the actual competition in lot of 
markets. This evolution is generally linked with the differentiation of products. This aspect has 
been taken into account in early theoretical contributions like these of Chamberlain (1933) or 
Hotelling (1929). On the other hand, empirical analyses are more recent, and different problems 
have been or have to be solved. 
 
The first important problem concerns the estimation of elasticity parameters. Because of the large 
number of differentiated products, we have generally not enough data to estimate elasticities, 
when using the traditional theory of demand. Two ways have been proposed to solve this 
problem (Foncel et al. 1996). The first way is to group some products together and to estimate 
only elasticity of substitution between groups. Haussman et al. (1994) have proposed an 
application by using sequential budgeting. The second way is in the line of the new theory of 
demand proposed by Lancaster (1966): the utility of consumers is expressed in function of 
products characteristics (instead of number of products consumed). Numerous applications have 
been done using the theory of discrete choice (Anderson et al. 1992). Compared to the traditional 
theory, the lack of degree of freedom is generally overcome, but some other problems appear 
(Berry et al. 1995). 
The second problem concerns the information on products characteristics. Basically, the 
differentiation is completely perceived by the demand under the hypothesis of perfect 
information. But numerous works have shown that the diffusion of innovation is sometimes long 
because of users learning. Unfortunately, diffusion models do not take into account the level of 
differentiation
1 as differentiation models do not take into account diffusion process linked with 
information learning
2. 
The third problem is more operational. On a period of time, introduction of innovations leads to 
an increase of competition, and old products are eliminated. Generally, to predict evolution of 
market shares, all introductions of innovation have to be know. If no important breakthrough 
happens, introduction of all new products may be summarized with synthetic variables (number 
of products, performance of the leading products, etc.). In that case, predictions need only to 
anticipate evolutions of these synthetic parameters. 
 
The purpose is illustrated here with a study of the French market of hybrid corn seeds (1978-
1994). In the section 1, we present the main features of this case, and the set of data used 
thereafter. Some descriptive statistics are presented to show that this is an exemplary case to 
illustrate both diffusion and increase of competition effects. The basic model is presented, with 
                                                  
1 A clear distinction has to be made between the two main features of diffusion process (only the first one will be 
highlighted in this paper): (i) learning of users which give them more information directly by testing products or 
indirectly by learning of other users, (ii) incentives on the supply side to improve the products and lower production 
costs when demand is growing, which accelerate diffusion. The second aspect can be treated with a standard model 
of differentiation because changes in prices of products and characteristics are explicitly taken into account (see 
Trajtenberg (1989) for an application to the Scanner). 
2 Recently some authors have mixed the two effects, but these contributions are generally theoretical (Bergemann et 
al. 1996; de Palma et al. 1998)   3
its results, in section 2. This model is an application of the theory of discrete choices, and 
includes diffusion effect as with additional dummies. Two extensions are tested in section 3, and 
a more general discussion on the combination of diffusion and differentiation effect is addressed 
in conclusion. 
1. The French market of hybrid corn seeds 
1.1. Main features 
-  Supply side 
In this sector, the property rights (breeder's right) give a temporary monopoly to the creator of the 
variety (i.e. the product), with the constraint that genetic contains has to be stable. For that 
reason, each improvement of product characteristics leads to a new product. Breeders can sale the 
license to other firm, but this practice is so unusual in France that each product can be consider as 
sold by only one firm3. No important progress has been made on the production process, so 
production cost can be considered as stable. Note also that sales to farmers are made by local 
distributors. Their effect will not be considered in the basic model, but will be discuss in the 
extensions of the models. 
-  Demand side 
Corn is used for silage production to feed animals in the farm, or grain production sold out to an 
elevator. In each case, the lag between sowing and harvesting is about six month. Climate 
variation during this time can affect yield, and make the choice of the farmer uncertain. The 
effect on yield level is such that products ranking can change from year to year. This has two 
main implications: 
-  Farmers share risk among different varieties
4. Sharing is generally more important when 
the differences of yield between products is low. 
-  Farmers take more risks when using young products, because these products have not been 
tested in a large range of climates. The analysis of market share have to take into account 
the diffusion effect at the beginning of the life cycle. The process first lies on learning of 
technical value by leader farmers. Then, the choice of leaders spread to followers. These 
two basic aspect of diffusion has been previously described in numerous contributions 
(Griliches 1957; Feder et al. 1982; Jensen 1982). 
-  Different forms of differentiation 
The differentiation of products in this market is both horizontal and vertical. For a given crop, 
horizontal differentiation is linked with the adaptation to the geographic areas. Basically, farmers 
from the north of France must use early varieties, while farmers from the south can use late 
varieties. Extension services (AGPM in the case of corn) make comparison of varieties within 
group, each earliness group corresponding to a particular area in France. Seven groups of corn 
                                                  
3 This assumption should not be done for the American market where organization of sales is different. But we will 
not consider this case here. In France, the only case where license appears frequently is when a firm is a foreign 
breeder, and sales are done by an exclusive representative in France (e.g.: RAGT is the exclusive representative of 
Dekalb). Note also that generally the representative does not sale variety from other breeders. 
4 The number of products among which risk is shared is limited for technical reason. Farmers do not use generally 
more than 5 products for a given crop.   4
seeds are distinguished in France by the AGPM, and they are numbered from 10 (early, adapted 
to the North) to 16 (late, adapted to the South). Generally, firms try to sale a minimum of one 
variety by earliness group. Note also that in the circumstance of the French market, early varieties 
are used for silage production while late varieties are used for grain production. 
 
As horizontal differentiation is based on the earliness characteristic, vertical differentiation is 
based on other technical characteristics which correspond to the yield or to the resistance to 
diseases. Each new product is registered on an official catalogue if its yield is better than the 
reference level estimated from a small sample of current most sold varieties. This official 
catalogue is a powerful tool to promote new better products and the market share of off-catalogue 
products is negligible5. For this study, the technical value of seeds can be reasonably summarized 
by the yield level because: (i) it is a synthetic variable which capture a part of the effect of other 
characteristics as resistance to diseases, (ii) the productivist model promoted in France incited 
farmers to choose seeds with high yield level. The use of corn production do not affect the main 
characteristic: yield is measured on the all plant for the silage, while it is measure only on grain 
production in the other case. Vertical differentiation can easily be checked by the fact that, within 
an earliness group, varieties with high yield are more expensive. 
 
Basically, the farmers choose between all the varieties adapted to his geographic area. 
Competition between products occurs first of all within earliness groups. Nevertheless, at the 
frontier between two areas of adaptation, farmer may choose between products of different 
groups. Finally, the substitution within earliness groups is higher than the substitution between 
earliness groups, but this last one is not negligible. 
1.2. Data used in this study 
For each variety registered in the French and the European catalogues, four types of stable data 
are available for each variety: the date of release, the earliness group (from 10 to 16), the 
breeder(s) which owns the property right, and the repesentant(s). This data comes from the 
bulletin of varieties jointly distributed by the CTPS and AGPM. 
 
For all these varieties, annual sales in France from 1976 to 1994 were provided by the GNIS. The 
year 1988 was eliminated because of too much missing data. Unfortunately, no data on prices 
were available. Data on technical characteristics are freely available to farmers. For each variety, 
the CTPS provides yield estimation (form trial tests) during two years before release and AGPM 
provides estimation for the two or three following years. This set of technical characteristics is 
very interesting because it reflects the general assessment of farmers on product. Moreover, as 
CTPS and AGPM are extension services whose objective is to provide the best informations to 
farmers, we can reasonnably consider this information as good indicator of farmers' choices. 
                                                  
5 This catalogue does not exist in United States, and this is the main reason why organisation of sales is quite 
different.   5
1.3. Evidences on the diffusion and competition effects 
We can start with a simple descriptive model where market share of the product i at the t th year 
after its release is decompose as follow: 
  ii SAB tt =￿  (1) 
Despite its very rough form, this model gives interesting results
6. Estimates of B are reported in 
graph 1, and other results in table 1. Estimations of B follow a very general pattern, first 
increasing and then decreasing. 
 
Table 1. Results from the regression on the diffusion effect 
Groupe  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Nb obs.  986  1194  575  378  397  480  228 
Nb. par.  193  242  144  74  94  98  54 
R
2  0.751  0.772  0.810  0.809  0.801  0.763  0.784 
 
The first years correspond to a diffusion period. Basically, the yield is the major technical 
characteristic of crops, because it influences profit of farmers. However, because of climate and 
farming changes from one year to another, the yield of one variety can fluctuate. For that reason, 
it takes several years for farmers to have a good knowledge of products' performance
7. 
 
The decrease of B reveals the increase of competition. Two figures are very illustrative of this 
evolution (see table 2): 
-  For the whole French market, there were 175 products in the late 70's and 550 products in 
the middle 90's. The number of products has been multiplied by three for all the groups, 
with some differences between early groups where this number has increased tenfold, and 
late groups where it has doubled. The multitude of product is both the result of an increase 
of the number of product proposed by each firm, and an increase of the number of firm on 
the market. 
-  Between 1976 and 1994, yield growth varies between 20% and 35% depending on the 
segment, which is very large compare to the 1-3% mean progress that each product brings. 
It means that during this two decades, the list of products has been completely renewed 
one or several times. 
 
                                                  
6 Estimation has been made on the log of the market share. 
7 This aspect was taken into account in Griliches (1957) seminal study on diffusion of hybrid corn. As he explained 
after (Griliches 1980), the diffusion of hybrid corn was not only due to revelation of informations, but also to hybrid 
improvment between the 30's and the 50's. In our study, diffusion is only due to revelation of informations because 
data are studied at the variety level, for which the characteristics are stables.   6
Table 2. Innovation in the different earliness groups  
Number of seed varieties  Group  Main use 
80  85  90  95 
Annual yield increase 
10  E  27  55  108  148  24% 
11  E  53  74  113  150  21% 
12  E/G  17  27  54  107  32% 
13  E/G  16  28  36  29  18% 
14  G  25  26  33  46  38% 
15  G  29  36  35  41  25% 
16  G  7  20  26  24  33% 
    174  267  405  543   
 
2. The basic model 
2.1. The basic model 
As described in the previous section, sales are determined by two main factors: the yield (x) 
which reflects the differentiation level, and the level of knowledge on product characteristics (b). 
More formally, the utility of the variety i for the farmer j at the year t is decomposed as follow: 
 
  1 ijtititijt uxbe - =++  (2) 
 
Farmer's utility is a direct function of his profit. Because payoff is the product of yield by crop 
price, it is logical to consider the utility as a linear function of yield. To represent learning on 
product characteristics, x is defined as an estimation of the yield, and it can change from year to 
year. We introduce a lag of one period, because the choice at t depends on all the information 
revealed until the previous period t-1. The level of information is supposed to be identical for all 
the farmers, and the variation of estimation and/or information level among farmers is 
represented by the term eijt which expresses the specificity of choices. 
 
We consider that the knowledge acquisition depends more on the context (extension system, 
farmers network, etc.) than on the variety. For that reason, we suppose that b is identical for all 
the varieties with the same age. In other words, if Ti is the date of release of the variety i, the 
equation (2) can be modified in the following way:  
 
  1 i ijtititTijt uxbe -- =++   (3) 
 
After comparing of the different varieties within a given earliness group, we suppose that the 
farmer chooses the best one. Like most of the traditional models, we make the hypothesis that the 
specificity term is independently and identically distributed (iid) following a double exponential 
distribution. The market share of the product i within the earliness group I follows a multinomial 
logit
8: 
                                                  
8 See Anderson et al. (1992) for a complete treatment.   7
 

























  (4) 
 
The parameter at is defined in such a way that the denominator of equation (4) is equal to 
exp(at). It leads to the final form of the basic model: 
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a is a parameter to be estimated which reflects the sensitivity of farmers to the difference of yield 
(a is expected to be positive). This sensitivity can change depending on three factors: 
1.  For any farmer in the area of an earliness group, the difference of yield is more or less 
easy to estimate. For the case studied here, it corresponds to the difference between areas 
oriented toward silage production, and areas oriented toward grain production. Grain 
production is sold, and for that reason the farmer knows precisely the quantity he 
produced. Conversely, silage production is used inside the farm for livestock feeding and 
the quantity can only be roughly estimated. For that reason, we expect a to be higher in 
grain production oriented areas (group 12 to 16). 
2.  The aggregate sensitiveness of farmers to differences in yield is higher when the choices 
of farmers inside the area are homogeneous. The ranking of variety can change from place 
to place inside an area of adaptation because of micro-adaptations not captured by the 
differentiation of earliness groups. Moreover, farming habits may also change from place 
to place, and this can influence the ranking. Such a variation is captured in the model by 
eijt in equation (2) and (3). High variance of e expresses very heterogeneous choice and, 
by construction, it leads to small level of a. 
3.  As discussed before, no reliable data on prices are available. Generally, models of 
differentiated products consider price as an endogenous variable: the demand is first 
expressed as a function of price and technical characteristics; then, Nash equilibrium on 
price is established on the supply side. Our model which does not take prices into account 
is equivalent to a model where price, at the equilibrium, is a linear function of yield. In 
other words, the parameter a captures both the sensitivity to yield differences and the 
sensitivity to price differences. Because the effect of price on sales is generally negative, 
the higher the sensitivity of farmers to prices differences is, the lower is a. 
 
at is a synthetic estimated indicator of competition level. The higher at is, the higher the 
competition level is and the lower the market share is (ceteris paribus). at can be explained as a 
function of descriptive statistics, in order to have more simple forecast. exp(at) has first been 
defined as a the sum of utility of the products, which is also the number of product times the 
average utility. If we suppose that the distribution of product yield and product ages are stable, 
then we can eliminate the effect of b and replace it by a constant m. 
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After more development, we obtain: 







Łł ￿K   (7) 
 
For convenient reason, we introduce the constraint that b is negative. Because we expect b to 
increase, the constraint is introduced by supposing that b is nil when the variety is older than a 
certain level (different level will be tested). With this constraints, exp(b) increases within the 
interval [0,1]. For that reason, exp(b) can be interpreted as a coefficient of diffusion, and it is 
generally accepted that it follows an S-shaped function (Griliches 1957; Karshenas et al. 1995). 
Some simple dynamic property of market share can be analysed by supposing that exp(b) follows 
a logistic function
9: 
  ( )
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By introducing that in equation (5), we obtain
10: 
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The following property can finally be observed : 








b >￿￿-￿>   (10) 
For a given increase of competition, only young products with low values of b have increasing 
market share. After a while, market shares will decrease because b is too high. Moreover, we can 
see that the faster the competition increases, the younger the product will turn to decreasing 
market share. 
 
Substitution properties have also to be discussed. One of the main critics that have been 
addressed to the multinomial logit model lies on the property that when a new product is 
introduced, the market shares of other products decrease homothetically. Berry et al. (1995) 
illustrate this with the following example: supposing that a Lada has the same market share than a 
Mercedes, then the multinomial logit forecasts that the introduction of a BMW decreases the 
market share of both the Lada and the Mercedes by the same amount. However these critics has 
less effect when we apply the model inside a group of products where the substitution is more 
regular. We turn then to a nested logit (Trajtenberg 1989; Berry 1994). Our application 
corresponds to this last case because we have distinguished different earliness groups. Actually, 
the strong assumption of the model does not concern substitution within a group, but rather 
substitution between products of one group and external alternatives. The first external alternative 
is the product of the neighbouring group. We have seen that farmers on the frontier of two areas 
of adaptation may choose between products of different groups. This effect is generally taken into 
account in nested logit by compiling a matrix of substitution between groups. This has not been 
done yet, and we implicitly suppose that that substitution between groups is always nil. The other 
crops represent the second type of external alternative. Depending on the relative prices of 
                                                  










10 xit is suppose to be constant over time for simplicity.   9
products (corn, wheat, sugar beat, etc.), some markets could increase at the expend of others. This 
treatment as not been done yet also. Even though substitution hypothesis seems to be strong, it 
has to be noted that we try to explain market share instead of sales. In other words, total sales of 
one earliness group may increase or decrease, the model only suppose that market shares of all 
the products are still the same. 
 
2.2. Results with the basic model 
The data used for this study has been described before (see section 1). We do not present the 
result for the group 16, because the corresponding area covers the south of France and the north 
of Italy and/or Spain (the market shares in France is not representative of market share for all the 
area). The methodology for calculating estimation of xit is described in details in the appendix A. 
Remember also that the regression has been made with the constraint that b is nil after a while. 
Different periods have been used for this limit. If we choose a long time (for example 10 years), 
estimation of b first increases, taking even positive values, and then decreases. The decrease is 
similar to the one that has observed in the descriptive model (see section 1), and represents 
increase of competition which is also capture by at in the basic model. To eliminate the 
redundancy, and to have tractable values of b we have taken the maximum length of time which 
still respects the hypothesis of increasing estimation of b. 
 
Table 3. Results with the basic model 
  10  11  12  13  14  15 
Nb obs  986  1194  579  378  397  480 
Nb par.  22  22  23  21  21  22 
a  0.075  0.083  0.107  0.125  0.091  0.131 
b0  -2.463  -2.418  -3.001  -2.499  -2.231  -2.693 
b1  -1.286  -1.586  -2.191  -1.269  -0.677  -1.443 
b2  -0.427  -0.700  -1.403  -0.724  ns -0.219  -0.552 
b3  ns -0.024  -0.275  -1.044  ns -0.162  0.000  * -0.427 
b4  0.000  0.000  -0.765  0.000    0.000 
b5      0.000       
R
2  0.322  0.314  0.463  0.263  0.251  0.348 
Auto.  0.641  0.717  0.733  0.661  0.772  0.687 
Estimated parameters are always significantly different from 0 at the level of 5%, except for * where the level is 
10%, and `ns' where it is non-significant at the level of 10%. `Auto' means autocorrelations, and is measured by 
the R
2 of the model explaining the residual at t as a function of the residual at t-1. 
 
The results are given in table 3 and graph 2. The estimation of the parameters have expected sign: 
a is significantly positive, b is negative and significant for the first years, at increases over time. 
Despite these expected signs, the model lets important residuals: R
2 varies from 0.25 to 0.50. This 
drawback has to be qualified because the number of parameters is no more than 7% of the total 
number of observations. Such a weighting is made with a test of Fisher, and then the model 
cannot ever be rejected. Residual are auto-correlated: for a given variety, the market share   10
estimated by the model is either under-estimated or over-estimated, but rarely both. Because of 
the large number of degrees of freedom which are still available, there are probably some ways to 
improve the explicative power of the model. 
 
From one group to the others, the model reflects correctly the variation of sensitivity to 
differences in performance. The estimation of a are lower for the north of France where the main 
use is silage, and sensitivity to price is greater. 
 
The evolution of competition has been explained by the number of products and the average 
performances (see equation (7) for the model and table 4 for results). The model has a good 
explicative power (R
2 always superior to 0.75), and the effects are positives (when they are 
significant) as expected. 
For the earliest groups (10 and 11), increase of yield does not explain evolution of competition, 
while its effect is significantly positive for later groups (13 to 15). For these last case, it is 
interesting to note that estimation of c2 are closed to estimation of a in table 3: a unitary progress 
on the yield (xit) has the same effect on sales than a drop of one unit of the average yield (x0t). 
 
For the analysis of the effect of the number of products, we have to consider separately the case 
of groups 10 to 12 where this number is tenfolded, and the groups 13 to 15 where it double. 
Comparison of group 11 and 12 shows clearly the opposition of using: the increase of 
competition is explained only by the number of products for the group 11, and only by the 
genetic progress for the group 12. The group 10 is closer to the group 11, even if the effects are 
not significant. For the groups 13 to 16, the effect of the number of products is generally 
significant but, compared to the effect of the average yield, it contributes to a less extend to an 
increase of competition. 
 
Table 4: Analysis of evolution of competition (a a t) 
  10 11 12 13 14 15
c0  ns -3.743 ns -11.703 -19.492 -17.335 -19.180 -19.364
c1  ns  0.036 0.068 ns 0.026 ns 0.032 0.022 0.109
c2  ns -0.004 ns -0.172 0.131 0.140 0.136 0.122
R
2  0.703 0.753 0.883 0.860 0.858 0.973
   11
3. Extension of the basic model 
3.1. Hypothesis H1: the accident effect 
-  Presentation 
One of the original facts in our model lies on the idea that performance is an estimation that can 
change from year to year depending on the new revealed information. Suppose that the yield in t 
is much greater than the estimation at the end of the year t-1 (xit-1), then we will have xit<xit-1, and 
the model will predict a decrease of market share (ceteris paribus). 
We want to test here a possible improvement the predictive power of the model in case of very 
bad revealed information for young varieties. This phenomena has been suggested by experts: 
"we know that if a product shows some problems during the first years, we will never be able to 
sell it after, even if we show that this bad event was quite unusual''. This phenomenon can be 
interpreted by saying that the interaction between the climate and the variety is interpreted 
differently depending on the age of the variety. In more illustrative terms, if a young product 
behave badly it means that it is bad, but if the same bad information is revealed when the product 
is older, it means that the year was bad for this product. 
 
This hypothesis is tested with a dummy variable qit which default value is 0, and take the value 1 
if the estimation falls more than y percent, and the variety is less than DT years old. More 
formally: 















  (11) 
 
The effect of this dummy is then added to the basic model (equation (5)), and the accident effect 
is defined by a parameter d to be estimated: 
 
  ( ) 1 ln
i itititTtit saxd baq -- =￿+-+￿   (12) 
 
Generally, fall of xit does not exceed 10%, and y have to be less than 5% to have sufficient 
frequency of accident. Two other values of y are also considered (3% and 1%). The effect of DT 
can not be tested here because technical values are only available during the 4 first years, and xit 
is stable thereafter. In other words, because of the data used here, accident can only be identified 
during the first three years, so it is not necessary to defined limit age. 
 
-  Results 
 
Comparing to the basic model, R
2 increases a little bit (no more than 5%), The sign of d is always 
negative (as expected) but the significance varies, depending on the group and the value of y 
(table 5). Before analysing the values, we need to have some marks on the importance of this 
effect in terms of market share. We can translate the effect of d by an equivalent fall of yield of 
d/a (because the effect of the yield is multiplied by a). Note that such a simple translation can be   12
made because the estimations of other parameters are similar in the two models (equation (5) 
and (13)). If we take q=-0.5 and a=0.1, the equivalent fall of yield is equal to 5 points, which is 
important compared to the maximum differences of yield between varieties at one time (between 
5 and 10 points). The accident effect is such that it cancels all the competitive power brought by 
the increase of performance of one product (the experts' expression given at the beginning of the 
paragraph is confirmed). 
 
Accidents appear to be more frequent in the earliest group. This can be explained by the more 
constraining climate in the North of France. As we can expect, the estimations of d is more 
important when y is higher. For groups 13 to 15, d is never significant with y equal to 5% and 
3% because accidents are not frequent enough. d becomes significant with y equals to 1%, and in 
that case, the estimations are more important than for the groups 10 to 12. Finally information has 
to be more unfavourable in the North of France than in the South to have some effects on sales. 
This is probably because information are more frequently unfavourable in the North. However, 
when it happens, the effect is such that the variety is eliminated from the market. 
 
Table 5. Test of the "accident effect" (H1) 
    10 11 12 13 14 15
y=5%  Freq.  11% 6% 4% 3% 3% 5%
  d  -0.434 -0.674 -1.067 * -0.779 ns -0.171 * -0.517
  R
2  0.330 0.326 0.481 0.269 0.251 0.352
y=3%  Freq.  25% 18% 13% 9% 4% 10%
  d  -0.362 -0.574 -0.561 ns -0.075 ns -0.500 ns -0.033
  R
2  0.333 0.335 0.474 0.263 0.254 0.348
y=1%  Freq.  53% 50% 50% 45% 18% 31%
  d  -0.205 -0.238 -0.330 -0.535 -0.946 -0.513
  R
2  0.326 0.319 0.470 0.282 0.296 0.364
 
3.2. Hypothesis H2: the firm effect 
-  Presentation 
In the basic model, and even with the H1 extension, two products with the same release date and 
the same revealed information have the same sales during all their life cycle. We consider here 
that, depending on the type of firm which sales it, the market share can be different. The 
hypothesis H2 can be justified by three arguments: 
-  A firm with large sales has generally a good reputation, because farmers know the 
products that it has proposed before
11. Because of the parental link between products 
proposed by the same firm, the information on old good products influences favourably 
estimation of the value of new products of the same firm. 
                                                  
11 Note that the two hypothesis that are necessary for the emergence of reputation effect in game theory are present 
here: (i) uncertainty on gains, (ii) repeted games (Shapiro 1983).   13
-  The firm with a large market share has generally more powerful and more adequate means 
to promote its products (experience of marketing division, advertising budget, etc.). 
-  Such a firm is more powerful in front of distributors, because its products represent a 
larger share of distributors activity. 
 
The total market share of the firm on the market appears to be a good criterion. It can be 
compiled easily by making a sum of the sales of all the firm's products (remember that each 
product is most of the time produced by one firm). Because of the similarity between some 
groups, we have compiled the total sales of each firm for the North of France (group 10 to 13) 
and for the South of France (group 14 to 16). Firms have been classified in four categories which 
limits are 1%, 5% and 10% (see table 6). A given firm may change of category if its total market 
share increases or decreases
12. The category 0 corresponds to the smallest firms, and the 
constraint of no firm effect has been introduced in that case. Three dummy variables have then 
been defined: gikt (k˛{1,2,3}) which default value is 0, and takes the value 1 if the variety i is 
sold by a firm of category k at time t. The new model to test is then: 
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Table 6. Definition and size of categories of firms 
Number of seed companies 




(market share on 
the area)  Mini  Maxi  Moy  Mini  Maxi  Moy 
0  < 1%  19  25  21.1  11  16  12.4 
1  1% à 5%  3  11  7.7  1  8  6.0 
2  5% à 10%  1  5  2.7  1  4  2.3 
3  > 10%  1  4  2.5  1  4  2.4 
 
-  Results 
Compared to the basic model, the introduction of the firm effect improves substantially the R
2 
(table 7). The estimations of firm category effects are positive and significant (at least for the 
largest firms). The hypothesis H2 can not be rejected. The firm effect captures a part of the yield 
effect, because estimation of a are lower here than in the basic model. Nevertheless, estimations 
of the other parameters are similar. 
 
To go farther in the analysis, it is useful to have a clear idea of this firm effect in terms of sales 
(as we have done before for hypothesis H1). For that, the firm effect is translated in an equivalent 
supplement of performance in the basic model, in order to predict the same sales. The calculus is 
more complicated here because the estimation of a has changed. An adjacent calculus enables us 
to estimate this equivalent supplement of yield as at least 5 points for the largest firms. In other 
                                                  
12 Some adjustments have been made by hand in order to maintain an inertia and avoid, for example, a change from 
category 2 to 1 followed just after by a change from category 2 to 1.   14
words, the firm effect appears as important as the effect of the technical progress brought by a 
new variety. 
 
As we have seen in the beginning of this paragraph three main arguments can explained the 
origin of the firm effect. Unfortunately, the data set used here does not permit to differentiate 
those results. Experts generally agree to say that promotion of products is generally more 
important in early groups (10 and 11) because the technical differentiation is harder (cf. the lower 
estimation of a). Conversely, reputation seems to have more effect in the case of late groups 
oriented toward grain production, because the most implanted firms have proposed better 
products for more than 10 years. The relationship with distributors is generally independent of the 
group, but depends more on the local context (distributors have a power if they are in monopoly 
faced to farmers). 
 
Table 7. Test of the "firm effect" (H2) 
  10 11 12 13 14 15
a  0.077 0.076 0.091 0.115 0.061 0.108
e1 (1%-5%)  0.846 0.378 ns 0.036 ns 0.240 0.781 0.669
e2 (5%-10%)  0.744 0.520 0.585 ns -0.010 1.235 0.864
e3 (> 10%)  1.201 1.166 0.732 * 0.994 2.299 1.747
R




For the last 10-20 years, there was an increasing concern in the economic literature on the 
analysis of differentiated markets. This paper has tried to fill some inadequacy, and to test new 
propositions with an application to the case of the french market of hybrid corn. It can be 
summarized by three main ideas: 
1) When a new product includes technical innovations, it experiences a diffusion period during 
the first years after its release. Learning of demand, which is here the main explanation of 
diffusion, lies on two phenomena: individual learning and mimetism. This was include in the 
basic model first by considering technical characteristics as estimations
13, and second by 
including age effect in a kind of diffusion coefficient. Extension of the model show also that if a 
very bad information is revealed on a young variety, then diffusion is stopped even if it can be 
shown thereafter that this accident was quite unusual. 
2) Two identical products reach different market shares depending on the firm which sales it. 
This effect corresponds somehow to unobservable characteristics of products (for example, the 
trademark is one aspect of the style of the car in the works of Berry et al. (1995)). Nevertheless, 
the firm effect is different in the two kind of analysis. When it is considered as unobservable 
characteristics of products', the aim is to solve problems of estimation with endogeneity of prices 
                                                  
13 Some theoretical works has also consider technical characteristics as imperfect estimations in models 
differentiation. For example, Bergemann and Välimäki (2001) consider competition between two products (one old 
known product and one unknown new product), and analyse pricing policy implications.   15
(non independent residual). Here, the firm effect (based on reputation, advertising or relationship 
with distributor) makes diffusion easier. 
3) Innovation is a major aspect of the evolution of competition, measured here with a synthetic 
variable. In most early groups, differentiation is more difficult and competition increases mainly 
because of increasing number of products. In late groups, competition is more sensitive to 
technical progress because differentiation is easier. 
 
The model used here is very simple, but it introduces several constraints. Substitutability 
constraints are managed by analysing independently earliness groups. But the analysis of 
substitution between groups has to be done, to consider that we are using a nested logit model. 
Because prices where unfortunately unavailable for all products, we have to suppose that they are 
linear function of yield (at the equilibrium). The explicative power of this model can be improve 
because we have observed autocorrelation of residual, and a large number of degree of freedom 
are still available. In the addition to the better management of constraint described just before, 
three extension of the model are conceivable. 
 
Some other technical characteristics can influence the choice of farmer. Here, we have supposed 
that yield is a synthetic variable which include these effects. But it is imperfectly true, and 
perhaps some improvements are possible if we consider also the effect of resistant to diseases, or 
resistance to lodging. 
A significant improvement should be done also by taking the network of distribution into 
account. In France, distributors have probably an important effect, as well as the range of 
products proposed by each firm. This enhancement needs some preliminary theoretical 
exploration on the strategic equilibrium between seeds companies and distributors. This is a part 
of the agenda proposed by some author (Foncel et al. 1996). For the case of hybrid corn seeds, it 
would be very interesting to compare the case of France and United States whose networks of 
distribution are quite different. 
Diffusion can also be treated in a very different way. Based on Arhur's models of increasing 
return to adoption (Arthur 1989), De Palma et al. (1998) has proposed another way to take 
diffusion into account in the theory of discrete choice. A new formulation of indirect utility is 
proposed:  1 1 ititit uxs r - =-+￿ . Utility is both a function of technical characteristics and market 
share at the last period. The larger is sales, the larger is the amount of information available on 
the product, and this is a source of competitive advantage, as well as technical improvement. 
With such a model, we may found some lock in effect as in Arthur's model. One important 
exploration would be to test the permanence of this effect.   16
References 
 
Anderson, S. P., A. De Palma et J.-F. Thisse (1992). Discrete choice theory of product 
differentiation. Cambridge, London, MIT Press. 
Arthur, W. B. (1989). “Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events.” Economic Journal 99(934): 116-131. 
Bergemann, D. et J. Välimäki (1996). Market diffusion with two-sided learning. New Haven, 
Yale University: 39 p. 
Bergemann, D. et J. Välimäki (2001). Entry and vertical differentiation. Yale, Yale University, 
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics: 41 p. 
Berry, S. (1994). “Estimating discrete choice models of product differenciation.” Rand Journal of 
Economics 25(2): 242-262. 
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn et A. Pakes (1995). “Automobile prices in market equilibrium.” 
Econometrica 63(4): 841-890. 
Chamberlain, E. (1933). The theory of monopolistic competition. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press. 
de Palma, A., K. Kilani et J. Lesourne (1998). How network externalities affect product variety. 
Advances in self-organization and evolutionary economics. J. Lesournes and A. Orléan. 
London, Economica: 57-76. 
Feder, G. et G. T. O'Mara (1982). “On information and innovation diffusion: a Bayesian 
approach.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(1): 145-147. 
Foncel, J. et M. Ivaldi (1996). “Econométrie de la concurrence imparfaite sur les marchés à 
produits différenciés.” Revue Economique 47(3): 477-486. 
Griliches, Z. (1957). “Hybrid corn : an exploration in the economics of technical change.” 
Econometrica 25(4): 501-522. 
Griliches, Z. (1980). “Hybrid corn revisited : a reply.” Econometrica 48(6): 1463-1465. 
Hausman, J., G. Leonard et J. D. Zona (1994). “Competitive analysis with differenciated 
products.” Annales d'Economie et de Statistique 34: 159-180. 
Hotelling, H. (1929). “Stability in competition.” Economic Journal 39: 41-57. 
Jensen, R. (1982). “Adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 27(1): 182-193. 
Karshenas, M. et P. Stoneman (1995). Technological diffusion. Handbook of the economics of 
innovation and technical change. P. Stoneman. Oxford, Cambridge, Blackwell Publisher: 
265-297. 
Lancaster, K. J. (1966). “A new approach to consumer theory.” Journal of Political Economy 74: 
132-157. 
Shapiro, C. (1983). “Premiums for high quality products as rents to reputation.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 98: 659-679. 
Trajtenberg, M. (1989). “The welfare analysis of product innovation, with an application to 
computed tomography scanner.” Journal of Political Economy 97(2): 444-479.   17
A. Calculus of technical performance xit 
Gross data are published by trial. One trial gives results on 10 to 20 varieties from the same 
group. One trial reports the average performance of repeated plot in a geographic area for which 
the products appear to be adapted. Different technical characteristics are reported, but we have 
only considered the yield. 
xit has been compiled by progressive adjustments, as for a bayesian process (see Feder and 
O'Mara (1982) for a use of this process in case of a new variety diffusion). Suppose that we are at 
period t, and that the values xit-1 are known for all the varieties i. Three steps are necessary to 
compile xit. 
- Revealed performance 
Basically, the performance measured in a trial (phenotypic value) includes a year effect, which 
has to be eliminated in order to have coherent values from year to years. The revealed 
performance is defined relatively to some reference varieties, which are explicitly defined in each 
trial. Generally, these references correspond to the most used varieties, and they are between 5 
and 10 years old. We defined yitn as the yield measured for the product i at year t in trial n. J is the 
set of reference varieties for the same trial. The revealed performance is defined by zitn and is 














W ￿   (15) 
 
 
- Mean revealed performance 
it z  is the mean of zitn for all the trials n where the variety has been tested. 
 
- Adjustment of estimation 
Estimation at the end of year t is defined as the average of all the mean revealed performances 
until t (including t). The first revealed performance is in Ti-1, just before the release. Formally, 
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This formula is applied while the variety is tested. When it is not tested at all, we have no value 
for  it z , and the estimation are then stable (xit=xit-1). 
All the published data of CTPS and AGPM from 1975 to 1994 have been used. For the first year, 
no adjustment of estimation can be made because xi1974 were unknown. For each group, we   18
suppose that xi1974=100 for the most diffused variety. Starting from this value, estimations of all 
the following varieties released until the mid 90's are ranged from 100 to 150. 
Sometimes we do not have any published information on the value of some varieties with 
positive sales. It happens mainly for before 1980, with varieties released at the beginning of the 
60's. The varieties for which estimated performances can be compiled represent from 60% to 
90% of total sales (for all France) before 1980, and more than 95% after 1980. Results has been 
compiled both by taking into account or not the years before 1980. No difference has been 
observed, so the first years were finally kept. 
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